

# PRESS REVIEW ARCHIVE

Digital Media Monitoring & Documentation Service

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
**Archived Date:** August 15, 2025 at 15:01


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## Page Screenshot





SugarCRM 5.2.0e - Remote Code Execution

EDB-ID:  
8949

CVE:  
[2009-2146](#)

EDB Verified: ✓

Author:  
[USH](#)

Type:  
[WEBAPPS](#)

Exploit:  / 

Platform:  
[PHP](#)

Date:  
2009-06-15

Vulnerable App:



Name	Remote Code Execution in SugarCRM
Systems Affected	Sugar CRM 5.2.0c and possibly earlier versions
Severity	High
Impact (CVSSv2)	High 8/10, vector: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/PC:P/C:A/P)
Vendor	<a href="http://www.sugarcrm.com">http://www.sugarcrm.com</a>
Advisory	<a href="http://www.ush.it/team/ush/hack-sugarcrm_520b/adv.txt">http://www.ush.it/team/ush/hack-sugarcrm_520b/adv.txt</a>
Authors	Antonio "s4tan" Parata (s4tan AT ush DOT it) Francesco "ascii" Ongaro (ascii AT ush DOT it) Giovanni "evtlav3" Pellerano (evtlav3 AT ush DOT it)
Date	20090613

## I. BACKGROUND

From the SugarCRM web site: "Sugar Express is designed for individuals and small companies. Core CRM features help employees get on the same page while more complex functionality is stripped away. Sugar Express is ideal for providing a single view of the customer from the initial marketing campaign through the sales cycle and on to customer support. With Sugar Express, companies have a single system of truth for managing customer interactions."

## II. DESCRIPTION

A Remote Code Execution Vulnerability exists in SugarCRM software.

### III. ANALYSIS

Summary:

A Remote Code Execution issue has been found in SugarCRM version 5.2.0e. In order to exploit this vulnerability an account on the system is required.

The vulnerability resides in the "Compose Email" section. The software permits sending email with attachments (if not disabled by the administrator). When the name of the file is specified, a validation routine is called:

[illegible]

```
function safeAttachmentName($filename) {
    global $sugar_config;
    $badExtension = false;
    //get position of last "." in file name
    $file_ext_beg = strrpos($filename, ".");
    $file_ext = "";
    //get file extension
    if($file_ext_beg > 0) {
        $file_ext = substr($filename, $file_ext_beg + 1);
    }
    //check to see if this is a file with extension located in "badext"
    foreach($sugar_config['upload_badext'] as $badExt) {
        if(strtolower($file_ext) == strtolower($badExt)) {
            //If found, then append with .txt and break out of loopup
            $filename = $filename . ".txt";
            $badExtension = true;
            break; // no need to look for more
        }
    }
    // foreach
    return $badExtension;
}
```

[illegible]

This routine checks if the extension of the filename is blacklisted, if so the ".txt" extension is appended to the filename. However there is a coding error: the function assumes that the filename (extension excluded) is at least one char long, this assumption is derived from the statement:

[illegible]

```
if($file_ext_beg > 0)
```

[illegible]

Of course this is a bad assumption, if we set the whole filename to ".php" than the check is skipped and a void extension is assumed. Because void extensions are not in the blacklist, no further extension is added to the filename. After this check a file is created on the filesystem in the form "`<id><filename>`".

Where "id" is an alphanumeric string. With the trick illustrated we are able to create a file with ".php" extension. To do this upload a new file attachment and set the filename to ".php".

After this the attacker has to find the name of the file that was uploaded in the attachment list files. To obtain the real filename look in the HTML response for a string like:

[illegible]

```
<input value="6e25aba0-9dc4-2a57-8bae-4a1317b35d47.php" name="email_attachment0" id="email_attachment10" type="hidden">
```

[illegible]

The real filename in this case is "6e25aba0-9dc4-2a57-8bae-4a1317b35d47.php". Now the attacker has to find the directory where the file resides.

Again searching the HTML page for the attribute "assigned\_user\_id" reveals the needed information:

-8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--

```
<a href="index.php?module=Emails&action=ListView&assigned_user_id=abf7c77b-2f71-8071-63ba-4a131068e9a2&type=archived">
```

[illegible]

At this point the attacker has all the informations to invoke the uploaded file.

Filename: 6e25aba0-9dc4-2a57-8bae-4a1317b35d47.php  
Assigned user id: abf7c77b-2f71-8071-63ba-4a131068e9a2

To directly request it issue a request to:

[illegible]

http://www.example.com/cache/modules/Emails/abf7c77b-2f71-8071-63ba-4a131068e9a2/6e25aba0-9dc4-2a57-8bae-4a1317b35d47.php

-8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--8<--

As final note: if the user is "administrator", "assigned\_user\_id" is always "1"

always

#### IV. DETECTION

SugarCRM 5.2.0e and possibly earlier versions are vulnerable.

#### V. WORKAROUND

Upgrade to latest version 5.2.0f

#### VI. VENDOR RESPONSE

"We have fixed the issue and will be shipping the patch on June 12th. We will be doing a full pass of quality assurance in this area to ensure that no other issues crop up around file uploads. The fix involves modifying the code that handles uploads for email attachments to save the files using just a GUID rather than the original file name. This is similar to how uploads are handled elsewhere in the application and should prevent the code from being executable on the server side."

#### VII. CVE INFORMATION

No CVE at this time.

#### VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

20090519 Bug discovered  
20090528 First vendor contact  
20090528 Vendor Response  
20090530 Vendor Confirm the vulnerability  
20090602 Vendor propose a possible fix and path release  
20090612 Vendor released SugarCRM 5.2.0f (Vulnerability fixed)  
20090613 Advisory released

#### IX. CREDIT

Antonio "s4tan" Parata, Francesco "ascii" Ongaro and Giovanni "evilaliv3" Pellerano are credited with the discovery of this vulnerability.

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#### X. LEGAL NOTICES

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